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Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against
Mary Anne Case*
Let me begin this review essay on Ian Ayres’s Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional
Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination and Crossroads, Directions, and a New
Critical Race Theory, edited by Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P.
Harris,1 in the classic style of outsider jurisprudence, with a story of my own experience.2
Ian Ayres’s Fair Driving3 changed my life more directly than any other piece of legal
scholarship has before or since. At the time he published this, the first installment of his
empirical research into the higher prices car dealers tended to offer black and female
customers, I had just begun teaching at the University of Virginia School of Law, where
Ayres was then a visiting professor. I had moved to Charlottesville, Virginia from my
native Manhattan anticipating that I would need to make many changes in my life, not the
least of which would be the acquisition of a driver’s license and a car. Getting the
driver’s license proved surprisingly easy. A decade later, however, I have yet to buy a
car. There are many reasons for this, but I fear one of them is that among the things I read
before heading out to the car dealerships to negotiate a purchase, in addition to standard
informational material such as Consumer Reports, was Ayres’s work. Fair Driving
impressed on me the likelihood that, at the very least, I as a woman would be given a less
* Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the other
symposium participants for their encouragement and patience; to organizer Clark Freshman for putting it
all together; to the Square Table of Bigelow fellows, Douglas Baird, bGary Becker, Lauren Berlant, Robyn
Borok, Adam Cox, Adrienne Davis, Mary Duros, Margaret Schilt, Richard Epstein, Eric Hurst, Jenia
Iontcheva, Frances Kamm, Saul Levmore, Martha McCluskey, Tracey Meares, Marsha Nagorsky, Carl
Nightingale, Mary Patillo-McCoy, Dick Posner, Eric Posner, Todd Preuss, Gina Sanders, Cass Sunstein,
David Weisbach, and Iris Young for brainstorming and bibliographic help; and to Virginia Kim for
valuable research assistance. Research support for this project came from the Arnold and Frieda Shure
Research Fund of the University of Chicago.
1. Although everything I have to say in this essay was sparked by review symposium organizer Clark
Freshman’s mission of reading the two books in conjunction with one another, this essay is not in any
conventional sense a book review, but rather an exploration of what, as I see it, lies at the intersection of the
two books and the significance I see in the contrasts between them. Let me at the outset stress that the task
of considering these two works in relationship to one another will inevitably mean that I cannot consider
either one in all its richness and will be forced to omit mention of those valuable portions of both books
that do not fall at the intersection of the two as I have construed that intersection for the purposes of this
essay. The only consolation I can offer for this is that the other symposium participants, having each
focused on a different intersection, highlight some of the portions of both works I overlook. Additionally, I
have not attempted to summarize the content of either book, in part because other symposium participants
have done so better than I could hope to without being redundant. See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive
Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2003).
2. Or, to put it another way, “a trendy note of personal confession.” AYRES, p. 427.
3. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 817 (1991). Fair Driving is the foundation for Part I of Pervasive Prejudice?
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favorable opening bid from the dealer than a man and that there was a good chance my
final deal could be less favorable as well. I have an extremely strong taste for not being
discriminated against. While I generally try not to be paranoid about the extent to which
my sex may factor negatively into the way I am treated, Ayres’s reinforcement of my
suspicions was enough to paralyze my purchasing power. Not that I was too paralyzed to
negotiate. To the contrary, I attacked the negotiations with more than my usual toughness
(this in genteel Charlottesville) and in short order was offered deals knowledgeable
friends urged me to take, better deals than some males of my acquaintance had been
offered. But still, I was suspicious and unsatisfied. For me the question was not whether I
could get a better deal than a man, but whether I could get a better deal if I were a man, a
question I could not satisfactorily answer.4 Just the thought of some dealer saying to
himself, after I had signed on the dotted line, “There’s another extra hundred bucks from
another sucker female,” was enough to cause me to find every offered price
unsatisfactory.
From this personal experience I draw the two main themes I shall explore in this
essay: first, the need to examine and articulate far more precisely the victim’s preferences
and concerns in shaping remedies for many of the kinds of discrimination Ayres and the
Crossroads reader address; and second, the relationship of anecdote to data. One of the
most striking contrasts between Pervasive Prejudice? and Crossroads is that the former
centers on the perspective of the perpetrators of discrimination and the latter on the
perspective of the victims.5 By this I do not mean that the former is written primarily by a
white male6 and the contributors to the latter are [almost] all people of color or white
women. Rather, I mean that Ayres’s main concern is to establish to what extent and why
discriminators discriminate, while the Crossroads reader stresses, in classic Critical Race
4. This is the question Ayres tries his best to isolate, in seeking to reduce the differences between his
testers to their identity categories by rigidly controlling their dress, behavior, negotiating style, and
background information to make them as identical as possible. AYRES, p. 26-7.
5. This difference in perspectives is only a tendency; it is not categorical. For example, Ayres begins
his book with an Eddie Murphy sketch about the experience of discrimination from the victim’s perspective
and, in his important contribution to Crossroads, Devon Carbado carefully enumerates the advantages of
being what he calls “[p]rivileged [p]erpetrators . . . [t]hose of us who unquestionably accept the racial,
gender, and heterosexual privileges we have, and those of us who fail to acknowledge our victimless status
vis-à-vis racism, sexism and homophobia . . . .” Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet: Race,
Gender, and Sexual Orientation, in CROSSROADS, p. 221.
6. Although Ayres’s name alone appears on the jacket, individual chapters in the book are co-authored
with, among others, a woman, Laura G. Dooley.
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Theory fashion, the voices from the bottom and how discrimination affects them.
Taking seriously the emphasis on “Crossroads” and “Directions,” Frank Valdes urges,
in his contribution to the reader he helped edit, the need for “postsubordination vision as
jurisprudential method,” for “shifting the focus to visions, agendas, and projects of
substantive security” so that “critical legal scholars from varied subject positions
constructively can begin coalitional OutCrit theorizing by imagining and articulating the
substantive end goal of our respective yet collective antisubordination activities and
communities.”7 Valdes notes that “it sometimes is useful to imagine and spell out for
onesself (and others) not only what the project is ‘against’ but what also it is ‘for.’”8
Ayres similarly imagines his book to be potentially the beginning of a much larger
project of research. After setting forth the results of his “intensive investigation of a
smaller set of markets” and suggesting that “discrimination may occur in a wide range of
retail markets,”9 Ayres ends his book by urging that “[g]overnment should more
systematically test for disparate treatment across a wide variety of markets.”10 I agree
with Ayres that obtaining and disseminating such information would be quite valuable.
But because I also agree with Valdes in particular that spelling out what we are for is
useful, and with critical race theorists more generally that listening to the voices from the
bottom is necessary, let me urge as well that more systematic data gathering, testing,
surveying, analysis, and theorizing should also be done from the perspective of the
victims of discrimination in the retail markets.
What I have in mind is this: for some time, the motives of one who discriminates,
including the so-called taste for discrimination, have been the subject of a well-developed
taxonomy.11 We now understand, for example, that some sellers may have a personal

7. Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and “OutCrit” Perspectivity:
Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, in CROSSROADS, p. 399, 403. In urging more such
constructive imaginings, particularly in the area of remedies for the sort of discrimination in consumer
transactions highlighted by Ayres’s research, I do not mean to suggest that Crossroads is devoid of the sort
of work Valdes calls for more of. For example, Julie A. Su and Eric K. Yamamoto’s chapter, Critical
Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, details the emergence of alliances between Asian and Latina garment
workers in litigation and negotiations. CROSSROADS, p. 379-84.
8. Valdes, supra note 7, at 403.
9. AYRES, p. 11.
10. AYRES, p. 397.
11. My colleague, Gary Becker, was one of those instrumental in beginning to develop this taxonomy.
See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1957).

MARY ANN CASE

4

MARCH 21, 2003

aversion to contact with blacks;12 they may prefer to discourage black customers
altogether and pay a price in lost sales to do so. Others may not mind the contact so long
as it leaves blacks in a one-down position; they may actually prefer to have some black
customers, so long as they can have the satisfaction of overcharging them or treating
them shabbily. Still others may have no personal aversion to blacks, but believe their core
clientele has such an aversion; they may discourage black customers to curry favor with
white customers or to retain what for them is a high-class lily-white image from which
they hope to profit monetarily. And there are others who overcharge or underserve black
customers, not out of animus, but because they believe them to be suckers more likely
prepared to pay inflated prices or to put up with shoddy treatment. Additional forms of
statistical discrimination include merchants acting on the belief that blacks are more
likely to rob (and therefore need to be followed around), less likely to buy (and therefore
need less sales attention), more likely to default on credit (and therefore should be
extended worse terms or no credit), less likely to tip well or be repeat customers (and
therefore need not be treated as courteously). In addition to spelling out these important
varieties of discriminatory intent, economists have modeled the costs and the price of
discrimination in an elaborate literature. As I shall discuss below with reference to
Ayres’s work, it is well understood that the effective remedy for discrimination may
depend on where in the taxonomy of discrimination a particular actor falls.13
I have been surprised not to find in the literature a comparably well-worked out
taxonomy on the taste for not being discriminated against, a taxonomy that focuses on the
victim’s perspective rather than the perpetrator’s.14 To be sure, a careful reader of

12. I use blacks here only by way of example and because most of Ayres’s research focuses on them. I
could substitute any other group likely to be the targets of discrimination, for example women, sexual
minorities, Latinos, Asians, aboriginals, or immigrants, to name just a few of the groups included in the
Crossroads reader’s big tent of “coalitional theorizing.”
13. Ayres devotes a substantial portion of Pervasive Prejudice? to using the evidence he has gathered
to tease out distinctions among the motives of those discriminating in the transactions he studies. See, e.g.,
ch. 3, Toward Causal Explanation, in AYRES, pp. 45-87 (including a game-theoretical model of animus and
statistical discrimination in bargaining).
14. I do not mean to suggest that no work at all has been done on this question. Much of what I have
been able to find in either legal or economic literature centers on variations of the so-called Ultimatum
Game, in which Proposer is given a sum of money to divide with another player, Responder, who must
either accept or reject the offered division. In the event of Responder’s rejection of Proposer’s offer, the
sum of money is returned to the experimenter and both players get nothing. The fact that Proposers most
often offer something close to a 50-50 split and Responders most often reject offers of less than 20% of the
total sum is seen to provide insight into a taste for fairness. See, e.g., Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger &
Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 367
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Ayres’s work will observe that he mentions most of the major components such a
taxonomy would contain. For example, he notes that not only price and product quality,
but also “discretionary aspects of service” may vary depending on a customer’s race or
gender. These discretionary aspects, Ayres notes, can include quantifiable and less
quantifiable transaction costs such as longer waiting time, less friendly or
accommodating service, and less willingness to accede to special requests.15 As I shall
explain below, a more systematic enumeration of these components, including their
monetary and less tangible costs, as well as survey and other research on the relative
importance and value of each to consumers, would, in my view, be a useful part of
“planning the journey” Valdes calls for.16
I realize that the sort of thing I am here advocating may not be the kind of
postsubordination vision Valdes is most interested in. It may be too limited in its horizon:
it is a vision of the second best, not of the world after the revolution. According to Ayres,
“[s]ome civil rights advocates seem to worry that even acknowledging the possibility that
discrimination may have a variety of causes undermines the moral claims that
discrimination is wrong.”17 Similarly, some of those represented in Crossroads may
worry that my call for an increasing emphasis on distinguishing among the variety of
effects of discrimination may not only undermine the moral claim that all effects of
discrimination are harmful, but also give a falsely conciliatory impression that victims are
prepared to tolerate some forms of discrimination in return for being exempted from
others. Of course the antisubordination communities represented in Crossroads would
say of their postsubordination vision of consumer transactions what Jerome Culp said in
response to me when this symposium was first presented at Law and Society in

(1982); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1491 (1998); cf. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1565 (1998) (“I would like to see a series of ultimatum-game experiments
in which the proposers make the same offers to respondents who differ both among themselves and from
the proposers in age, sex, income, and education, viewed as proxies for or sources of differences in status,
self-esteem, or other plausible correlates of the sense of pride that causes respondents in the game to reject
chintzy offers.”).
15. AYRES, p. 7.
16 Of course, any taxonomy of a taste for not being discriminated against would not be symmetrical to a
taxonomy of discrimination. Among the reasons for this is precisely that those at risk of being
discriminated against are not in a position to fulfill all their own tastes and preferences but are forced to
react to the actualized preferences of those who choose to discriminate against them.
17. AYRES, p. 415.
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Vancouver—“we want it all.” That is to say, when we enter consumer markets, we want a
low price that is also a fair price on goods structured to suit our needs and preferences
purveyed to us by sellers that welcome us and treat us well. But just as, like Ayres, I
think that “acknowledg[ing] the possibility of multiple causes”18 is an important part of
proscribing discrimination, I think that acknowledging the possibility of multiple effects
is important in devising effective transitional remedies for it.
Once again emphasizing the perpetrator’s perspective, Ayres stresses that:
[D]ifferent causal theories [of disparate treatment] can militate toward the use of dramatically different
remedial measures. For example, mandating nondiscriminatory car pricing (the so-called no-dicker
sticker) is more likely to bring about refusals to deal if cost-based statistical inferences are causing the
discrimination than if revenue-based discrimination or consequential animus is driving the
discrimination. That is, dealers who believe that it costs more to sell to African Americans are more
likely to react to a mandated no-dicker sticker by refusing to deal than are dealers who initially offer
higher prices because they think African Americans have a higher willingness to pay. 19

Similarly, I would argue, different preferences on the part of consumers can also “militate
toward the use of dramatically different remedial measures.” Consider three recent
potential market ameliorations of the problem of race and sex discrimination in the car
markets discussed by Ayres, each of which responds best to an importantly different
component of the taste for not being discriminated against.
A legally mandated no-dicker sticker may assure a customer of pricing unaffected by
race or sex, but of little else—neither of a low price nor of friendly service. A black or
female customer interested, not only in making sure the price s/he pays is no higher than
that offered a white man, but also that s/he is doing business with a welcoming dealer,
may prefer something like the Saturn dealerships, where not only is no-haggle pricing
voluntarily chosen, but the company has engaged in an extensive advertising campaign
designed to market itself as valuing the patronage of women and African Americans and
committing to treat them well.20
A black or female customer primarily interested in negotiating the lowest possible
18. AYRES, p. 415-16.
19. AYRES, p. 415.
20. See, e.g., AYRES, p. 153 (describing ad campaign in which an African American Saturn salesman
describes his father’s bad experiences in purchasing cars elsewhere as influencing his decision to join
Saturn). I do not mean to suggest that advertising suggesting fair or good treatment is necessarily inherently
trustworthy. But, as I shall discuss below with reference to marketing targeted to gays and lesbians, the
mere signal of welcome to an underserved or victimized group may be valuable to its members.
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price, especially one who is “already relatively sophisticated,” may well choose the
Internet, however.21 Because the Internet will allow such a customer to conceal race and
sex until a price has been fully negotiated, it can reassure such a customer that s/he is not
paying a discriminatory race or sex premium. And the Internet tends to yield lower prices
overall than visits to dealerships.22 But precisely by concealing race or sex, by making the
transaction more anonymous and impersonal, the Internet deprives such customers of
what may be an important part of some people’s taste for not being discriminated
against—the opportunity to be treated fairly, respectfully, and as a welcome and valued
customer precisely as a woman or an African American, rather than as an anonymous,
raceless, sexless, faceless e-mail address on a computer screen.
Ayres noted another available trade-off in the Chicago car market into which he sent
his testers—dealerships in the city and in all-black neighborhoods tended to offer less
discriminatory (more equal) but higher prices; at suburban dealerships and in all-white
neighborhoods there tended to be more discriminatory pricing (i.e., greater variance
between the prices offered to white men and those offered to blacks) but over-all prices
were lower. A fully informed black consumer with a strong taste for not being
discriminated against might therefore prefer purchasing from a city dealership, but s/he
might pay for that taste in the form of a somewhat higher, though slightly more equal,
price.23 It therefore becomes worth asking as an empirical matter: How expensive in a
particular case is a taste for not suffering price discrimination, and how strong is such a
taste? How much might someone have to pay, and how much would s/he be willing to
pay to satisfy such a taste?
21. AYRES, p. 157. Ayres “worr[ies] that the primary impact of the Internet will be to improve the
bargaining power of consumers who are already relatively sophisticated. . . . There is thus the dark
possibility that the advent of the Internet may actually increase the variance in prices paid as negotiated
prices would increasingly tend to exhibit a bimodal distribution—with the savvy Internet shoppers getting
low prices and the less sophisticated, non-Internet shoppers continuing to pay substantial markups.”
AYRES, p. 157. But, while “[t]he Internet, by itself, does not seem to be an innovation directed toward
protecting those consumers who have been most likely to pay a high markup,” AYRES, p. 157, it may well
be just the innovation needed by those for whom only race or sex stands in the way of getting the best
possible deal by haggling in person. These “savvy,” “sophisticated” purchasers are just the sort of women
and minorities a classic merit-based view of the harms of disparate treatment sees as the most innocent
victims and the ones most worthy of protection. The Internet prevents “irrelevant” characteristics from
getting in the way of such customers’ profiting from “relevant” merits such as computer sophistication and
bargaining skills.
22. See, e.g., AYRES, p. 156 n.103.
23. See AYRES, p. 90. I am grateful to Ayres for reminding me of these findings at the symposium in
Vancouver. In setting forth these disparate results in his book, Ayres cautions that they are not all
statistically significant.
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Keeping the taxonomy clear is important—what I am calling a taste for not suffering
price discrimination is only a subset of the broader taste for not being discriminated
against. (I will have more to say about other potential component parts of this taste
below.) More generally, the taste for not being discriminated against is only a subset of
what is often referred to as a taste for fairness. In addition to the taste for not being the
victim of discrimination, a taste for fairness also encompasses tastes for not being the
beneficiary of discrimination, the perpetrator of discrimination, or an observer of or
participant in a system in which discrimination occurs.
The strength of one’s taste for fairness may be strongly dependent on whether one
would otherwise be the victim or the beneficiary of any unfairness. For the sake of
simplicity, let us concentrate for the moment on only the price term and the transaction
time in the sort of new car purchases Ayres studied. I have thus far equated the
perpetrator perspective with the dealership and the victim perspective with those blacks
and women offered higher prices. But, as Devon Carbado’s Crossroads contribution
reminds us, another important perspective in this situation is that of the white male
purchaser, a perspective Carbado calls that of the “privileged perpetrator,” who, if he
“tak[es his] identity privileges for granted, helps to legitimize certain problematic
assumptions.”24 I suspect that the taste for fairness among potential beneficiary groups
like white male car buyers spans the full range of potential alternatives with nontrivial
representation of each alternative. That is to say, some white males may get extra
satisfaction out of getting not only a low price, but one that is lower than that offered
members of particular other groups such as blacks and women;25 some may even be
willing to pay extra, not so much to reduce their own transaction costs, but to increase the
relative transaction costs of members of other groups.26 Other white men may just be
24. Carbado, supra note 5, at 221.
25. Some of this satisfaction may be the result of simple group-based animus. Additionally, doing
better than members of other groups may reinforce a false sense of the comparative merit of one’s own
group. Thus, for example, columnist Mike Royko (erroneously, given Ayres’s testers’ emphasis on uniform
bargaining strategy and background) gloated that, white men got better deals because, in comparison to
blacks and women, they were “smart,” not “dumb,” “more experience[d],” “better educated,” and “more
likely to do the research that helps them get a fair price.” Mike Royko, Color Not an Option in Best New
Car Deal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1990, quoted in AYRES, p. 154. A reaction like Royko’s can in turn be the
result of anything from an offensive desire to be superior to a defensive desire to eliminate the suspicion of
unfair advantage on the part of beneficiaries eager to forestall in their own and others’ minds the notion that
their advantage is unearned.
26. Among legal scholars, Richard McAdams has given the most sustained attention to the way in
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happy to get a low price, and indifferent to the fact that members of other groups get
charged more; the inequality in their favor is something they would be unwilling to pay
to reduce. Still other white men27 have a taste for fairness they would be willing to pay at
least something and possibly a substantial amount to satisfy: given the choice, they would
pay a somewhat higher price to a dealer they could be assured was not discriminating in
their favor. Of course, very few of them are put to the hard choice of saying to a dealer
who has offered them the lowest price, sorry, I won’t take it because you would not offer
it to my black and female friends.28 Instead, “privileged perpetrators” interested in
renouncing their privilege may be part of the market segment that responds to ads like
Saturn’s, touting a company’s eagerness to do business on welcoming terms with
members of historically disadvantaged groups and committing to offer the same (not the
lowest) price to all.
Even assuming that there are some “privileged perpetrators” prepared to suffer some
cost to satisfy their taste for fairness, it is almost certainly true that the taste for fairness is
unevenly distributed among potential victims and beneficiaries: not only will a far higher
percentage of the victim group likely be distressed by their relative position, the amount
one is prepared to pay to satisfy a taste for fairness is, I suspect, other things equal, likely
to be significantly higher if one would otherwise be the victim of unfairness. And, of
course, other things rarely are equal, as I will discuss further below. Among other
difficulties, women and minority group members also tend to have less disposable
income and wealth with which to indulge their taste for fairness—they may simply not be
in a financial position to turn down the lowest price available to them in favor of dealing
with a merchant whose prices, though less discriminatory, are higher. Moreover, even
which the taste for being relatively advantaged compared to members of another group influences behavior.
See generally Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
27. Ayres gives every indication he might be one of them himself, although I do not know where and
how he buys his cars.
28. There are other steps a well-intentioned beneficiary of retail car market discrimination might
possibly take to actualize a taste for fairness vis-à-vis individual blacks and women of his acquaintance—
he could offer to do the negotiating for them, split his savings with them, or facilitate their using his offered
price to shame a dealer into matching it. Similar measures have been used to avoid another form of retail
price discrimination, the tendency of laundries and dry cleaners to charge more for women’s shirts, jackets
and pants. I am aware of men who, knowing that a particular shop will judge the sex of otherwise fairly
androgynous garments by the sex of the person bringing them to the shop, will deliver the tailored shirts
and pants of their female friends together with their own so all will benefit from the lower “men’s” price.
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starting with no disadvantage in wealth or income, the more systematically someone
suffers discrimination, the less s/he will be able to afford to pay to satisfy a taste for
fairness on any given occasion. A white male who rarely suffers discrimination can
afford to turn down the occasional discriminatory deal he gets and walk off in a huff
because he is both unlikely to have to bear this cost often and likely to find alternative
deals favorable to him with respect to the transaction at hand.
The function becomes exponentially more complicated once we factor in all the
elements of service beyond the offering price. Some of those elements can readily be
monetized, at least to some degree. Consider the time spent on a transaction, waiting for
sales attention or bargaining with a salesperson, for example.29 One plausible measure of
its monetary cost to a customer is his or her hourly wage. But, just as there are both
dignitary and practical components to discriminatory pricing, so increased transaction
time costs more than just lost wages. As Ayres says after reporting an audit study on
African Americans’ higher waiting times for D.C. taxis, “white readers should try to
imagine what their life would be like if every (or even just many) transactions took 27
percent longer.”30
Of course, many elements of discrimination one might have a strong taste for not
suffering are difficult if not impossible to place a monetary value on,31 but are not

29. Time spent negotiating, like waiting time, can be counted as a cost, at least with respect to the
average customer for whom such transaction costs are not a consumption good, as they may be for persons
who enjoy the process of haggling or chit-chatting with a salesperson. Ayres’s Table 2.3 indicates that
“dealers displayed a willingness to bargain longer with black male and white female testers—in terms of
both number of bargaining rounds and number of minutes.” AYRES, pp. 37-38. “Moreover, in 43.5 percent
of the tests, white males received an initial offer that was lower than the final offer made to the nonwhite
male testers.” AYRES, p. 36. Thus, there was a substantial relative cost in time imposed on testers who
were not white males.
30. AYRES, p. 7. Male readers should do the same. See Mary Anne Case, Toilet Paper: Public Toilets
as Gendered Spaces (last revised March 5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
31. This is not to say there might not be some price for which a victim might cheerfully consent to
endure such discrimination. Consider, for example, the young Thurgood Marshall’s experience working as
a summer waiter at the club of which his father was head steward, recounted in Richard Kluger’s Simple
Justice. As Justice Marshall told the story decades later, “in that off-stage dialect of his,” “a very crude”
United States senator came in and yelled, “‘Hey nigger! . . . Nigger, I want service at this table!’ So ah give
him the service an’ he is always callin’ me nigger all during the meal an’ ah’m likin’ it less an’ less. But
when he gets up to go, he leaves me a twenty-dollah tip. Now this crude fellah keeps comin’ into the club
and keeps on callin’ me nigger—and keeps on leavin’ me twenty-dollah tips. In a few days, I got myself
almost enough money to pay off all my bills.” When another senator called Marshall over to inquire
solicitously about the names he was being called, Marshall insisted, “‘He’s callin’ me “Boy,” Senator. . . .
[A]h’m sure that’s all he’s callin’ me . . . .’ Now ’course Senator Smith he don’t know this other in-div-idual is givin’ me the twenty dollahs each time. Well, now, that evenin’ my daddy . . . hears this fellah callin’
me that and sees me runnin’ right over there takin’ good care of him. So my daddy he calls me over and
says, ‘Thurgood, you are fired! And you are a disgrace to the colored people!’ . . . Naturally I explained to
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therefore less significant. Even if some aspects of courteous treatment, as Ayres reminds
us, have a practical component,32 “service with a smile” rather than a suspicious glance or
surliness, does not. Taxonomizing the taste for not being discriminated against must
include both the tangible and intangible aspects. Of course, even with respect to a single
transaction, there are not only a multiplicity of aspects to discrimination, but a
multiplicity of preferences for tradeoffs among them.
Consider one fairly basic real-life example, Gwendolyn M. Parker’s analysis of going
“out to both family style and fancy restaurants” as she accompanied her middle class
Southern-born African American parents on sightseeing trips through the North and West
in the early 1960s:
While my mother always tried to steer us toward the cheaper choices on the
menu, my father would tell us we could have anything we wanted. His attitude
was worth more than the lobster and shrimp I invariably chose. It kicked open the
doors of the world and held them wide for us. . . . Even as he went casually into
debt to finance these excursions, he had his rationales. “I don’t want them to grow
up thinking lobster is a big deal,” he would tell my mother.
This was one source of constant friction between my parents: [W]hat sort of
accommodation the world would demand. . . .
“I don’t think they’re serving yet,” my mother would say, turning from the
entryway of a restaurant she feared might be too expensive or less than
welcoming.
“I’ll go find the maitre d’,” would be my father’s response. On spying him, my
father would call out confidently, “Table for five.” It was my mother who noticed
the stares that might accompany us on one of our forays. My father would just
laugh and say, “Well, what can they do?”
There lay their differences in a nutshell: all my father needed was access, and the
my daddy what it was all about.” Justice Marshall concluded the story by insisting to his interlocutor, a law
professor, “‘Between you, me, an’ the lamp-post, Robert, any time you wanna to call me nigger, you just
put your twenty dollahs down on this table. And you can keep doin’ it all day.’ Then his eyes narrowed and
his voice suddenly hardened and he said, ‘But the second you run outa them twenties, Robert, I’M GONNA
BUST YOU IN THE NOSE!’” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 181 (1975).
32. These include the willingness to make exchanges without receipts and make restrooms available
without a purchase, as studied by Jane Connor in Binghamton, N.Y. AYRES, p. 7.
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rest he would get on his own; my mother hoped that the world would welcome
her, and when it didn’t, she retracted her feelings behind an imposing façade of
“proper” colored reserve. People in Durham had always said how much I was like
my father; in the North I learned I was my mother’s daughter as well. I might
stride in, apparently eager and confident like my father, but like my mother, as the
years went by, I grew alert to the lingering stare that dampened my own hopes for
acceptance.33
At the extreme, variations in the taste for not being discriminated against can even
reverse the valence of giving one’s business to an establishment that would prefer to
exclude the members of one’s group—while some may find the chilly reception to be a
cost, others may derive satisfaction precisely from being where they are not wanted but
cannot be excluded. David Caplovitz’s study of low-income black and Puerto Rican
consumers’ dealings with peddlers in New York City in 1960 shows one extreme of what
a customer might be willing to trade off in price and quality for respectful treatment,
however. In enumerating “the elements of the system of exchange that comprise the lowincome market,”Caplovitz stressed the importance to the consumers of “the reassurance
of dealing with merchants who ma[d]e them feel at home” even when these merchants
purveyed “low-quality merchandise at exorbitant prices.”34 In a very different variant of
willingness to reward merchants who welcome one’s business, the gay and lesbian
community has been notoriously loyal to the first brands to place gay-themed ads and
advertise widely in gay publications, such as Absolut vodka.35
33. GWENDOLYN M. PARKER, TRESPASSING: MY SOJOURN IN THE HALLS OF PRIVILEGE 54-56 (1997).
34. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 20
(1967). Caplovitz also observed, “In the large, bureaucratic stores where prices are standardized, the race of
the customer does not affect the price. The neighborhood merchants and peddlers, on the other hand, are
specialists in a more personal system of credit and apparently do take the race of the customer into
account” with the result that a far higher percentage of blacks and Puerto Ricans buying from traditional
neighborhood dealers are paying a “higher” price than those who buy from a “bureaucratic” (“department,
chain, [or] discount”) store. Id. at 92. According to Caplovitz, however, “consumers from a more traditional
society,” such as recent arrivals from the South or Puerto Rico, “unaccustomed to the impersonality of the
bureaucratic market” may have found merchants’ “read[iness] to personalize their services” valuable. Id. at
20.
35. See, e.g., Dan Baker, A History in Ads: The Growth of the Gay and Lesbian Market, in HOMO
ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 11, 12 (Amy Gluckman & Betsy
Reed eds., 1997). Not having advertisers target them appropriately is yet another form of discrimination
some groups can suffer. Consider the resistance of advertisers of certain luxury car brands to purchasing air
time on “radio stations that serve primarily Black and Hispanic” urban consumers, as described in Robert
Millar, Racism is in the Air: The FCC’s Mandate to Protect Minorities from Getting Shortchanged by
Advertisers, 8 CommLaw Conspectus 311, 315 (2000). Such a decision not to advertise to them hurts these
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For some the taste for dealing with an in-group salesperson or store owner might be
worth paying for with higher prices.36 Others may assume (often erroneously, if Ayres’s
findings are representative)37 that an in-group member will give them a better price or
more favorable terms; their use of group status as a proxy is as imperfect as that of
vendors. Still others may have a preference for in-group vendors only all other things
being equal: they may be unwilling to travel an additional block or pay an additional
dime to deal with one of their own.
Price and courtesy by no means exhaust the parameters of a taste for not being
discriminated against. Additionally, there is the question of whether the products
available for sale, regardless of price, meet the preferences and the needs of groups like
women, blacks, and other minorities. Thus, the woman who follows the rule of a
character in Alison Bechdel’s comic strip “only [to] go to a movie if it satisfies three
basic requirements—one, it has to have at least two women in it . . . who, two, talk to
each other about, three, something besides a man”38 will find precious few mainstream
movies to attend. Even the supply of art house flicks will soon give out. African
Americans have long voiced similar complaints about available entertainment options, as
have Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, gays, and lesbians.
The problem of lack of suitable options becomes all the more serious when the
product in question is a practical necessity, like a car, and the lack of suitable options
compromises not ideological preference alone, but also safety. Yet women drivers are
faced with exactly such choices—cars are systematically designed to ensure increased
safety for the typical male driver at women’s expense.39 It adds insult to injury if women
groups not only as potential consumers of the product to be advertised, but as consumers of the medium in
which the ads might have appeared: it means a reduction in the revenues and potentially in the viability of
stations favored by minority listeners.
36. There are many reasons why this might be so. Among them are a desire to support the business
ventures and contribute to the success of in-group members, e.g., to keep black dollars in the black
community. Comfort level may also play a role, as Caplovitz argues. See e.g., CAPLOVITZ, supra note 34, at
19-20 (describing merchants’ success in hiring Puerto Rican salespersons to reassure recent arrivals
“concerned about possible embarrassment because of their broken English or their poor dress.”).
37. See AYRES, p. 43 (reporting that testers “were steered toward salespeople of the same race and
gender” and “that testers systematically received higher offers from salespeople of the same race and
gender”).
38. Alison Bechdel, Dykes to Watch Out For Presents THE RULE, DYKES TO WATCH OUT FOR 23
(1986). The character acknowledges that the “last movie [she] was able to see was Alien. . . . The two
women in it talk to each other about the monster.” Id.
39. Consider the evidence of U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-95-4, HIGHWAY SAFETY:
CAUSES OF INJURY IN AUTOMOBILE CRASHES 51 (1995):
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are asked to pay more for a less suitable product. Moreover, products announced as
specifically designed for them tend to be even more expensive, as a casual walk down the
aisles of a typical drugstore should indicate: t-shirts, underwear, and socks labeled as
being for women, though differing from “men’s” chiefly in being smaller, tend to be
significantly more expensive; pastel-colored “feminine” shaving equipment can be twice
the price; even drugs like ibuprofen tend to cost more when branded for women’s
complaints.40
One of the substantial costs of being a member of a group likely to be discriminated
against is perpetually walking the fine line between blithely naive obliviousness of
discriminatory treatment and the paranoia of suspecting discrimination in every situation
and around every corner. It is the cost of living at all times with the question mark Ayres
so eloquently appends to his title Pervasive Prejudice? Let me illustrate this difficulty
with a variant on the oft-told tale of an African American consumer finding limits placed
on her access to a retail establishment and the consumer goods it purveys. The variant of
this scenario likely most familiar to readers of law journals is Patricia Williams’s
Benetton story, about being locked out of a branch of the clothing store at midday in the
Christmas season. The version I shall explicate is fictional, from a recent episode of the
new television series Monk, whose title character, an obsessive-compulsive detective, is
assisted in dealing with his phobias and, eventually, in dealing with the cases he must
One possible reason for the relatively high degree of crash protection enjoyed by men drivers
and younger drivers is that efforts at improving automobile crashworthiness have concentrated on
the crash types and occupant characteristics most experienced by them. Current safety regulations
and automobile safety designs emphasize protection in high-speed frontal collisions, and men
drivers and younger drivers are more likely to be in single-car crashes, which disproportionately
involve frontal impacts. The automobile crash tests NHTSA currently requires for all cars include
full-frontal crashes into a rigid barrier at 30 mph (although the introduction of a requirement for
side-impact tests is under way). Air bags reduce the risk of injury in frontal impacts only, not in
side impacts. Similarly, safety belts are more effective in frontal than in side impacts . . . and
because of this, safety belts have a somewhat greater benefit in single-car crashes than in
collisions with cars and light trucks.
A second possible reason for the crashworthiness deficit of women drivers compared with men
drivers is that current NHTSA regulations require the use of only one size of crash test dummy—a
dummy representing the 50th percentile of the male population, or 5 feet 9 inches tall, weighing
165 pounds. Maximizing the safety of persons with these characteristics may, in a relative sense,
compromise the safety of others.
Another possible explanation for the greater injury risk for women drivers is that, on the
average, women are shorter and lighter than men. Automobiles designed to accommodate taller
and heavier men drivers may not accommodate women as well. For example, the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (1993) recommends that drivers sit back as far as possible from the
steering wheel and dashboard in order to minimize the risk of hitting those structures in a crash.
Shorter drivers obviously cannot sit as far back as taller drivers if they hope to reach the
accelerator and brake pedals, and this may expose them to more risk.
40. See, e.g., Marketplace: You May Be Paying Too Much, CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1998, at 8
(noting that “peculiar pricing” with items targeted to women sold at higher prices “is alive and well at your
local supermarket, drug store, and department store” and giving examples).
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solve, by the nurse assigned to him after his wife’s murder occasioned his nervous
breakdown. A running theme of the show are the threats of the nurse, Sharonna, a white
woman, to quit and find other employment if she isn’t paid more regularly. In the
relevant episode, Sharonna has actualized this threat by taking a job in an upscale lamp
store. But just as she is trying to throw herself into this brand new job and put Monk and
his troubles behind her, she has a flash of insight into the case he had been working on
when she quit. She realizes that if she doesn’t act on this insight immediately, someone
might be killed. So she prepares to rush out of the store to forestall the danger. Precisely
at this moment, she is approached by a polite, well-dressed African American female
consumer seeking to purchase a lamp.41 They have roughly the following conversation:
Sharonna (somewhat frantically): “Excuse me, we’re closing.” Customer (incredulously):
“Now?” Sharonna: “It’s a holiday.” Customer (more incredulously still, but politely):
“What holiday?” Sharonna: “Lamp Day.” Whereupon Sharonna rushes out of the store,
never to return, and proceeds to prevent a murder and save the day for Monk. Looked at
from the customer’s perspective, what has happened to her is just what happened to
Patricia Williams and countless other people of color rebuffed when trying to participate
in a routine way in consumer transactions. Precisely because the history of such rebuffs is
so well-known and widespread, it is likely to factor into this particular customer’s
understanding of what has happened to her on this particular occasion. Of course, we, the
viewers, privileged with a broader and deeper angle of vision into Sharonna’s
motivations, know that the customer’s abrupt exclusion from the store was not at all the
result of pervasive prejudice. Given the urgency of Sharonna’s mission and her lack of
attachment to her position as salesperson, no other customer, not even the boss, would
have been treated better. But the customer herself can never know that. From her angle of
vision, she has been a victim. My point is surely not that “pervasive prejudice” is all in
the mind of African American female consumers. It is rather that one of the costs of the
pervasiveness of certain kinds of prejudice to its victims is never being able to be sure
you are not a victim, even on those occasions when you are not.42 This is the uncertainty

41. I do not know, but I wonder, whether the show’s producers cast an African American woman in
this part advisedly.
42. As Ayres notes, “having a better inkling about the existence of discrimination is different than
knowing, first, whether a particular instance of treatment is inferior to that of other customers and, second,
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that poisoned my dealings in the car showrooms, that led me, like Patricia Williams, to be
“quite willing to disenfranchise myself, in the heat of my need to revoke the flattery of
my purchasing power.”43
The need not to be or be perceived as a victim can shape attitudes and shopping
behaviors in a multiplicity of ways. For example, Devon Carbado enumerates some of
what he calls “race-negating strategies to challenge this dignity-destroying social
meaning” of “potential criminal[ity]” imposed on a black male “walk[ing] into a
department store”—he can “dress ‘respectable,’” rapidly purchase an expensive item,
ingratiate himself with “a white sales associate,” etc.44 In contrast to this strategy of
conciliation designed to prove one is not a criminal or too uppity or difficult to deal with,
Carol Rose describes other potential strategies designed to prove one is not a sucker. She
demonstrates that women, merely because they are perceived to have a greater taste for
cooperation and less of a taste for confrontation and aggressive bargaining, may—
because of that perception alone—be offered systematically worse deals. Having
constantly to prove oneself to be a tough bargainer, just like having constantly to prove
oneself not as vulnerable as might be assumed, can be wearying—it may take such a toll
that “even a . . . strong woman . . .may grow weary of the constant challenges and simply
stay at home.”45 If she continues the fight, as Carbado notes, she risks being dismissed as
“moody, irritable, or brusque” and crossing “the line between being assertive and
aggressive.”46 Thus, rather than achieve the better deal potentially available to tough
bargaining white males, she may provoke a refusal to deal. Regardless of the ultimate
outcome, as both Carbado and Ayres make clear in their different ways, any change of
behavior imposed on someone to avoid his or her suffering other forms of race or sex
discrimination is a harmful cost.47
whether that disparate treatment is caused by your race.” AYRES, p. 10.
43. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 46 (1991).
44. Carbado, supra note 5, at 231.
45. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 440
(1992). While Rose’s chief focus is the effect of perceptions of women’s comparative willingness to
cooperate on the bargains they can reach in the marriage and employment markets, her analysis can be
applied to the retail car market described by Ayres.
46. Carbado, supra note 5, at 229-30.
47. See e.g., id. at 231-32 (“White people do not have to worry about employing these strategies.
White people do not have to work their identities to respond to these racial concerns. Nor should they have
to. No one should.”); AYRES, p. 51 (“Even if women and other minority members could avoid
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The experience of discrimination in the markets, in addition to shaping one’s
shopping behaviors, may also shape the products for which one shops. Because there is
some, albeit contradictory, evidence that this effect may be particularly strong with
respect to the purchase of cars by African American men in Chicago, Rachel Moran is
right to be critical of the fact that “[w]hen Ayres discusses animus in the retail car
market, he does not root it in the history of segregation and discrimination in Chicago.
Nor does he explore the special meaning of cars as a mark of status and freedom.”48 How
might the history of discrimination and the social meaning of cars intersect to affect the
purchasing choices of a black consumer? In his study of patterns of black consumption
before 1960, Marcus Alexis notes that a “prominent black comedian has quipped that
blacks can afford to buy expensive automobiles because of all the money they ‘save’ by
not having to spend it on high-rent apartments, club fees, and eating out” due to exclusion
caused by segregation.49 The data Alexis analyzed indicated “that blacks actually spen[t]
less for automobile transportation than d[id] whites at comparable-income levels” and he
found no study that “supports the stereotype of large-scale ownership of Cadillac-class
automobiles by blacks.”50 Yet, according to Carl Husemoller Nightingale:
In 1949 and in various surveys in the late 1960s, advertisers discovered that poor
black men were much more likely than poor white men to buy Cadillacs,
Lincolns, and high-priced Buicks (though all poor men usually bought their cars
used.) . . . . The author of an article called “Why Negroes buy Cadillacs,” which
appeared in a 1949 edition of Ebony, confirmed that “basically, a Cadillac is an
instrument of aggression, a solid and substantial symbol for many a Negro that he
is as good as any white man.”51
Mary Patillo-McCoy’s sociological study of a middle-class black Chicago
neighborhood at the time Ayres conducted his initial tests reconfirms the symbolic
significance of buying a particularly expensive car to black Chicagoans: “The driver of [a
discrimination by acquiescing in not violating their expected roles, however, forcing black or female
consumers to conform to a particular societal stereotype as a prerequisite for receiving equal treatment
represents a powerful form of discrimination.”).
48. Moran, supra note 1, at 118 n.67.
49. Marcus Alexis, Patterns of Black Consumption 1935-1960, 1 J. OF BLACK STUD. 55, 57 (1970).
50. Id. at 73.
51. CARL HUSEMOLLER NIGHTINGALE, ON THE EDGE: A HISTORY OF POOR BLACK CHILDREN AND
THEIR AMERICAN DREAMS 144 (1993).
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Cadillac] buys it to signify first to him- or herself, then to friends, and finally to ‘the
white man,’ that he or she has made it. This affront, however, is always at the symbolic
level. It does nothing to alter the actual inequalities that consumers try to overcome.”52
Decades ago, David Caplovitz introduced the notion of “compensatory consumption,”
by which he meant to indicate that “the motive to acquire expensive durable goods is
quite strong among low-income groups, and that the ownership of such goods is apt to
take on symbolic significance of social progress for people whose chances for social
mobility are blocked.”53 The caveat he raised then is still important today: “[T]he
existence of this motive is still more in the realm of hypothesis than demonstrable fact.
What is needed is more research that would separate the various motives to buy among
the poor and assess the importance of each. How much of the consumer behavior of the
poor stems from their needs, how much from their vulnerability to unscrupulous
merchants, and how much from the motive of compensatory consumption remains to be
determined.”54 I would add that such research also remains to be done for groups likely to
be discriminated against regardless of income level. Again, the victim’s perspective has
received far less attention than the perpetrator’s.
What Critical Race Theory and Ayres’s style of Law and Economics have in common
is an interest in evidence, even if, as Ayres’s sub-title makes clear, that evidence is
sometimes “unconventional”—neither assumes a can opener, each is about cans and can
openers they have come to know. But a methodological divide remains between those
who are most likely to believe evidence when it can be reduced to numbers in a graph or
chart and those who are most likely to believe the evidence of first person experience.55
52. MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK
MIDDLE CLASS 148 (1999). Moving toward the purchase of overpriced automobiles may be the inevitable
next step for the black youth Patillo-McCoy documents as obsessed with another expensive and highly
visible means of getting around: brandname, celebrity-endorsed athletic footgear.
53. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 34, at xxvii. Recall Gwendolyn Parker’s father’s willingness to go into
debt so his children would not grow up thinking “lobster is a big deal.” See supra text accompanying note
33.
54. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 34, at xxvii.
55. Note that I am exaggerating this divide for effect. Moreover, I by no means intend to suggest that
Ayres and the contributors to Crossroads themselves mark out the extremes of this divide. Ayres, for
example, acknowledges the effect his own personal experience and his observation of others’ experience
had on his thinking. And graphs, charts, and statistics, as well as personal narrative, form part of the
contributions to Crossroads. See, e.g., Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory’s
Cutting Edge: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, p. 32 (incorporating statistical
tables and figures in analysis of Boalt Hall’s minority hiring record over time). My sense is that the divide
is greatest among potential readers, rather than authors, of the two books.
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What may be hardest of all to remember is that behind every dot on a graph and line in a
chart is a flesh and blood individual and that the chart is the result of aggregating these
individuals. Consider the number tattooed into the skin of a concentration camp survivor,
say 71502. It is important to remember the number, that its bearer is one of many, not an
aberration or exceptional; but it is also important that she is Judith Pinczovsky
Jaegermann and important that she is a Jew.56 It is difficult to hold name, number, and
identity category in your head at once—the horror of particularity and the horror of
aggregation is each in its own way overwhelming. To take a less freighted image,
consider the trick of making a face out of the photos of several thousand faces—what you
see in this mosaic is entirely a question of how finegrained is your examination of what is
before you.
Reading Crossroads and Pervasive Prejudice? together caused me to reflect more
deeply than I had previously on the often casually asserted proposition that “the plural of
anecdote is not data.” Different proponents of this view mean different things by the
contrast between data and anecdote. Some may have in mind the difference between a
controlled study and happenstance observation, others the difference between a large and
a small sample size, and still others the difference between that which can be quantified
and that which cannot. I am personally becoming more convinced that to the extent that
the plural of anecdote is indeed not data (and under some definitions of both it may be)
this only reinforces the need for both anecdote and data to make a case. Ayres himself
repeatedly, both explicitly and implicitly, acknowledges the usefulness of anecdote as a
supplement to the sort of data he gathers.57
But the full extent of Ayres’s own faith in data of the sort generated by controlled
testing is revealed by his enthusiastic endorsement of the Implicit Association Test
(“IAT”) as a means of testing for discriminatory intent. Ayres’s faith in the test is
56. See
Women
in
the
Holocaust:
Personal
Reflections—In
Camps,
at
http://www.interlog.com/mighty/personal/jaeger.htm (detailing an individual’s personal reflections on her
holocaust experience).
57. For example, his own uncontrolled (anecdotal) experience being told by a nanny agency, “Tell me
your prejudices. We’ll only send you pink polka dotted nannies if that’s what you want. If you’re not
comfortable with a [sic] older or a younger girl, we’ll make sure that you only have to interview candidates
that you like,” not only led him to file a complaint, but also suggested a new avenue for research. AYRES, p.
403. And, although critical of the failure of a television news program to discuss statistics, he
acknowledges the power of the stark visual (anecdotal) image of blacks and whites being treated differently
on one occasion as they enter a store filmed on a hidden camera by beginning his book with it. AYRES, p. 1.
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unshaken by his own results. He is “saddened to report that after taking the implicit
attitude test several times, I have consistently been rated as having a ‘moderate’ to
‘strong’ automatic preference for whites relative to blacks.”58 From these results, Ayres
concludes not only specifically that he is “less qualified for holding certain types of
employment,” but more generally that the test would be a useful way to prove
discrimination lurking beneath the surface.59 Paradoxically, my own opposite results on
the test lead me to the opposite conclusion about its usefulness. I, too, taking up the
explicit challenge with which Ayres ends his book,60 have gone through the IAT several
times. When I do, I consistently turn up as one of that small minority of the population
with no association strong or weak, positive or negative, between blacks and bad things.
If that were my only result on the test I might self-righteously rejoice in a demonstrable
absence of racism, conscious or unconscious. But I also turn out, on another version of
the IAT, to be one of that equally small minority of the population who do not show any
association between males and science. Now, my principal area of expertise as a feminist
legal theorist is gender discrimination, including the coding of occupations and
disciplines as masculine or feminine.61 As a theorist, I deplore such coding, but I do not
exempt myself from it. On the contrary, I quite consciously associate males more
strongly with science than females, as any sane well-informed adult62 in this society
would have to as a descriptive matter. I do not take my results on the IAT for gender to
be a triumph of my normative feminist commitments over my local knowledge. I take
them to be something else entirely—a tribute to the nuns who trained me to ace
standardized tests. The skill that now lets me demonstrate my impartiality once brought
me from an inner-city tenement to the Ivy League. Grateful though I am for the
possibilities opened by standardized tests, I owe much to the essay question as well—
58. AYRES, p. 427.
59. Id.
60. AYRES, p. 427 (“Now gentle reader, what about you? An answer is a few clicks away.”). The test
may be found at http://www.yale.edu/implicit/race/race2.html. See AYRES, p. 420 n.38.
61. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
62. Children may be a somewhat different matter, simply because their local knowledge can be very
local indeed. Consider the experience of the young daughter of an actor and a lawyer with whom I
practiced. Seeing her first male lawyer on a television program, her initial reaction was, “Men can’t be
lawyers.” After her parents carefully explained that yes, indeed, many men are lawyers, she confided in a
knowing whisper to a friend watching the next week’s episode, as one revealing a little-known secret:
“Men can be lawyers, too.”
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anecdote and data work best hand in hand.
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